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Wemeta-analyzed imaging studies on theory ofmind and formed individual task groups based on stimuli
and instructions. Overlap in brain activation between all task groups was found in the mPFC and in the
bilateral posterior TPJ. This supports the idea of a core network for theory of mind that is activated when-
ever we are reasoning about mental states, irrespective of the task- and stimulus-formats (Mar, 2011). In
addition, we found a number of task-related activation differences surrounding this core-network. ROI
based analyses show that areas in the TPJ, the mPFC, the precuneus, the temporal lobes and the infe-
rior frontal gyri have distinct proﬁles of task-related activation. Functional accounts of these areas areeta-analysis
ask groups
edial prefrontal cortex
recuneus
reviewed and discussed with respect to our ﬁndings.
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. Introduction
A central component of human social cognition is the ability
o attribute mental states to ourselves and others. This ability is
ften referred to as ‘mentalizing’, ‘mindreading’ or ‘theory ofmind’.
or nearly two decades, functional imaging has been used to study
ow this ability is implemented in the brain. To date, hundreds of
mpirical studies on this topic can be found in the literature. In the
resent study, we meta-analyze these imaging ﬁndings by forming
ifferent task groups based on the stimuli and instructions used.
Traditionally, the literature has been summarized in narrative
eviews (e.g., Saxe, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006). Some reviews pro-
osed that all sorts of theory of mind tasks consistently engage a
articular brain network (e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and
rith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). This network includes the medial pre-
rontal cortex (mPFC), parts of precuneus and posterior cingulate
ortex, the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the posterior supe-
ior temporal sulcus (pSTS) bilaterally. Less frequently, the bilateral
nterior temporal lobes and areas in the amygdala have also been
ssociated with this network (Frith and Frith, 2006; Mar, 2011).
he common feature of all tasks activating this network is that they
equire thinking about themental states of other persons (Frith and
rith, 2006). For example, Gallagher and Frith (2003, p. 78) noted
hat functional imaging studies on mentalizing have ‘. . . demon-
trated remarkably consistent results despite using multimodal
nd diverse cognitive paradigms, such as verbal and non-verbal
r on- and off-line tasks. Similarly, Mitchell (2009, p. 1310) noted:
. . . studies have established a small and highly reliable network
f regions that is preferentially engaged when perceivers mental-
ze about the mind of others.’ The author added ‘. . .researchers
bserved this pattern of activation regardless of whether mental
nferences are prompted by stories . . ., cartoons . . ., in the context
f competitive and economic games . . ., or by task instructions to
hink about a speciﬁc person’s mind . . .’.
At the same time, many researchers say that particular brain
reas subserve particular sub-processes of theory of mind (e.g.,
rith and Frith, 1999; Saxe et al., 2004a, 2004b; Gallagher and Frith,
003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner and
eekam, 2008). Moreover, it has been proposed that some sub-
rocesses of theory of mind are preferentially engaged in some
asks and not in others (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2006; Bahnemann
t al., 2010; Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner and Leekam, 2008). For
xample, Gobbini et al. (2007) observed that theory of mind tasks
hat focus on false beliefs tend to activate theTPJmoredorsally than
asks without false beliefs (e.g., social animations and point-light
ovement perception), which activate more ventrally in the pSTS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
In the recent years, quantitative meta-analyses have become a
tool for validating and extending the ﬁndings of narrative imaging
reviews. Theyoffer a statistical procedure to objectively summarize
imagingﬁndings in the formofbrain-mapsof convergent activation
(e.g., Eickhoff et al., 2009; Radua et al., 2012). Several groups (e.g.,
Bzdok et al., 2012; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009)
performed ‘pooled’ meta-analyses on theory of mind, i.e., putting
together all published imaging studies that used a term like ‘the-
ory of mind’ in their keywords. Findings of these meta-analyses
show the same large-scale networkof areas that has beendescribed
in narrative reviews. A methodological strength of pooled meta-
analyses is that they have high statistical power to detect ﬁndings,
as they are based on a large sample of all available studies. Large
variability, however, is also a drawbackof these approaches, as they
put together studies using different stimulus material and control
conditions, as well as studies with variable methodological quality
and rigor. In a conceptually diverse ﬁeld such as theory of mind
research, this will produce a lot of noise. For example, Mar (2011)
noted that: ‘Differences in approach to studying ToM may explain
some of the current disagreement regarding which areas are key
for mentalizing’ (p. 117). Up to now, only one review has looked
at task-related differences in activation for theory of mind with a
quantitative method (Van Overwalle, 2009). The author performed
a region of interest basedmeta-analysis on social cognition, includ-
ing the domain of theory of mind. A limitation of van Overwalle’s
(2009) approach is that ﬁndings of his method are bound to the
scope of the a priori deﬁned regions of interest. For example, the
TPJ was analyzed with one single region of interest, spanning from
pSTS (at z=3) up to the dorsal TPJ (located in the inferior parietal
lobe, at z=39). The author observed convergent activation in this
region for a wide variety of theory of mind tasks. For example, con-
sistent activation was found in the TPJ for false belief tasks as well
as for social animations. This observation stands in contrast towhat
was proposed by Gobbini et al. (2007) and other researchers (e.g.,
Aichhorn et al., 2006; Bahnemann et al., 2010; Perner and Leekam,
2008).
In the present study, we performed a review of theory of mind
imaging studies, and sorted them into task groups that had compa-
rable stimulus-material, instructions and control conditions. This
reduces the problem of pooling across studies which differ on con-
ceptual andmethodological aspects, and offers amore-ﬁne grained
picture of the evidence. In addition, we performed a whole-brain
meta-analysis on a voxel-by-voxel basis, which allowed us to look
at local differences in more detail than earlier works (e.g., Van
Overwalle, 2009). Our meta-analysis aims at providing a system-
atic and quantitative evaluation of two previous claims. First, we
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anted to evaluate to what extent different theory of mind tasks
onsistently activate a common set of brain areas (e.g., Amodio
nd Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). Second, we
anted to evaluate if some sub-areas of the theory of mind brain
etwork are preferentially engaged by some tasks and not by oth-
rs (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Bahnemann et al., 2010; Gobbini et al.,
007; Perner and Leekam, 2008).
. Methods
.1. Literature search and study selection
The literature reviewed in our meta-analysis was retrieved by
everal strategies. First,weadopted the literature sampleof a recent
arge-scalemeta-analysis (Mar, 2011). Theauthor categorizedstud-
es into story-based versus non-story based tasks, and looked at
eta-analytic overlaps between them. In contrast, the present
tudy seeks to meta-analyze brain activation for individual groups
ormed on the basis of a certain type of task, i.e., studies that have
resentedcomparable sortsof stimuli and instructions.Mar’smeta-
nalysis contained literature on theory of mind published between
995 and 2010 with the following strategy: Mar (2011) performed
key-word search in thedatabases PubMed, ScienceCitation Index,
nd PsycInfo. The criteriawere the following: studieswere selected
f (i) they included one of the key-words ‘neuroimaging’ or ‘fMRI’ or
PET’ and (ii) one of the key-words ‘theory-of-mind’ or ‘mentaliz-
ng’ or ‘mindreading’.WeupdatedMar’s (2011) literature sampleby
eplicating the author’s search for the literature published between
010 and 2013 (up to January 2013). Based on the literature sample
etrieved in these two steps, we attempted to identify task groups
epresenting frequently used experimental paradigms to study
heory of mind. A task group had to contain studies which used
imilar stimuli and presentation-modes, similar task-instructions,
nd results fromcomparable contrasts. Aswearenot awareof exact
riteria for the minimum sample size in imaging meta-analysis, we
nsured that our task groups had samples within the typical range
ound in the literature. We refer to a recent summary article of 94
ublished imaging meta-analyses (David et al., 2013). This paper
eports that the interquartile-range of the number of participants
ncluded in imaging meta-analysis lies between 123 and 355, and
he IQR for the number of original studies included lies between 8
nd 20. All our task groups had sample-sizeswellwithin that range.
fter a preliminary list of task groups was deﬁned, we searched
hrough multiple existing literature reviews on theory of mind and
elated topics to ﬁnd additional studies falling into these groups
Bzdok et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2012; Perner
nd Leekam, 2008; Spreng et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van
verwalle and Baetens, 2009).
We then applied a number of methodological selection-criteria
o the body of literature identiﬁed by our search (see e.g., Radua
t al., 2012). Studies were only selected if they had performed
whole brain analysis and reported activation coordinates in
tandard space (MNI or Talairach). Data from clinical samples
ere removed. We ensured that the same threshold throughout
he whole brain was used within each included study, in order
o avoid biases toward liberally thresholded brain regions. Note
hat this does not mean that different studies should employ
he same threshold. We also ensured that all activation maps
ntering our meta-analysis refer to a basic process of reasoning
bout/processingmental states. Therefore,weonly selected studies
hich contrasted a task clearly referring tomental state processing
ersus a task which clearly did not. This excluded several study
ypes, for example studies which compared inferences about oth-
rs’ versus ownmental states orwhichdidnot engagemental states
n any condition. If a study reported more than one contrast, wehavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 11
selected the one best corresponding to contrasts reported in other
studies of a task group. In total, we meta-analyzed 757 activation
foci reported from 73 studies that tested 1241 participants. Our
meta-analysis contained six different task groups: (i) false belief,
vs. photo, including 112 activation foci from 15 studies with 259
participants, (ii) trait judgment tasks, 111 foci, 15 studies, 253 par-
ticipants, (iii) strategic games, 68 foci, 9 studies, 162 participants,
(iv) social animations, 203 foci, 14 studies, 224 participants, (v)
mind in the eyes tasks, 146 foci, 10 studies, 185 participants and
(vi) rational actions, 117 foci, 10 studies, 158 participants.
2.2. Meta-analytic methods
2.2.1. Effect-size signed differential mapping
We used Effect-Size Signed Differential Mapping (ES-SDM)
software, version 2.31 for meta-analysis (Radua et al., 2012;
www.sdmproject.com). SDM is based and improves upon the
positive features from existing peak probability methods for meta-
analysis, such as Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE, Eickhoff
et al., 2009) or Multilevel Kernel Density Analysis (MKDA, Wager
et al., 2007). ES-SDM uses standard effect size and variance-based
meta-analytic calculations. Based on the reported t-values and
the sample size of a study, ES-SDM creates a map of effect-sizes
(Hedge’s g values) and a map of variance, with the latter being
derived from the distribution of effect-sizes and the sample size
of the study. Effect-sizes are calculated for those voxels contain-
ing a peak that is reported in the results table of an original study.
For the remaining voxels, an effect-size is estimated depending on
the distance to close peaks (<20mm) by means of an unnormalized
Gaussian kernel. In thepresent analysis,weused the recommended
Gaussian kernel with a FWHM of 20mm. A validation study which
compared the results of coordinate based ES-SDMmeta-analysis to
the results of a standard voxel-wise GLM analysis of the same orig-
inal data (Radua et al., 2012) found that this FWHM provided an
optimal balance between sensitivity and speciﬁcity. For statistical-
analysis, all foci were transformed to Talairach space which is the
native space of the software, by using the matrix transformations
proposed by Lancaster et al. (2007).
Wecalculatedameananalysis for each taskgroup. Calculationof
the meta-analytic mean map is implemented by a random-effects
model in which each study is weighted by the inverse of the sum of
its variance plus an estimate of between-study heterogeneity. The
latter is obtained by the DerSimonian–Laird method (DerSimonian
and Laird, 1986). This approach enables studies with larger sam-
ple size or lower variability to contribute more, and that effects
are assumed to randomly vary between samples. Statistical signif-
icance of the mean map was assessed by a permutation test that
randomizes the location of the voxels within the standard SDM
gray matter template. Thus, the null hypothesis of these permuta-
tion tests is that effect-sizes are randomly distributed throughout
the brain. 100 random maps were generated with the same num-
ber of input foci as included in the to-be-tested map. Finally, the
meta-analytic maps were thresholded using a voxel-level (height)
threshold of p<0.005 (uncorrected) and a cluster-level (extent)
threshold of 10 voxels. This uncorrected threshold was found to
optimally balance sensitivity and speciﬁcity, and to be an approx-
imate equivalent to a corrected threshold of p<0.05 in original
neuroimaging studies (Radua et al., 2012). For convenience, we
report all activations in MNI-space.
2.2.2. Complementary analyses
Weused theheterogeneity analysis in ES-SDMto checkwhetherthe brain areas found by our mean analysis showed strong vari-
ability across studies. ES-SDM calculates a Q-statistic based on the
between study variance in effect-size estimates for a given area.
Heterogeneity can then be tested for signiﬁcance by determining if
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he observed between-study variance for a given area is larger than
hat resulting from sampling error alone. For convenience, hetero-
eneity values are converted into standard z values in ES-SDM.
Systematic whole-brain voxel-based jackknife sensitivity anal-
sis was conducted. This consists of repeating the main statistical
nalysis for each study in the meta-analysis once, and discarding a
ifferent study each time. This means, we removed one study at a
ime, performed an analysis on the remaining studies, replaced the
tudy and repeated this process. The rationale of this test is that
f a previously signiﬁcant brain region remains signiﬁcant in all or
ost of the combinations of studies, it can be concluded that this
nding is highly replicable.
.2.3. Overlap analyses
We used three methods to determine brain regions that were
ctivated by all task groups. First, we used conjunction analysis
Nichols et al., 2005), which calculates a simple overlap between
egions that were found statistically signiﬁcant in the individual
eta-analyses. This was done with the ‘image calculator’ utility in
PM8 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk). This procedure showsﬁndingswhich
re individually signiﬁcant in all six meta-analyses at our default
hreshold ofp< .005uncorrected, z>1, andminimumcluster extent
0 voxels.
However, the conjunction approach may be biased toward a
alse impression of selectivity. This is because the number of stud-
es in each of the task-speciﬁc meta-analyses is much lower than
he number of studies in the pooled analysis, thus reducing the
ower of the individual analyses. To address this problem, we car-
iedout apermutationbasedoverlapanalysis.Here,wedetermined
he overlap between two halves of the pooled meta analysis sam-
le, each consisting of the studies from three different task groups.
his procedure was repeated ten times to create every permuta-
ion for assigning six task groups to two sample-halves. Carrying
ut conjunction analyses between the sample-halves yielded ten
aps of overlap, which were then again merged by conjunction
nalysis, giving a ﬁnal map of overlap between task groups.
The third way to determine overlaps between task groups
as a multimodal meta-analysis as described by Radua et al.
2013). Whereas the conjunction analysis determines the over-
ap between binary thresholded maps, multimodal meta-analysis
etermines overlap based on the actual p-values from the original
eta-analytic maps. Thereby, the method takes into account that
-values from the unimodal meta-analyses may be estimated with
ome degree of error. Signiﬁcance is determined by an adjusted U
tatistic based on the convenient null-hypothesis that not a sin-
le one of the meta-analyses shows activation in an area (for more
etails, see Radua et al., 2013). The multimodal meta-analysis was
nitially created for the case of twometa-analyses (e.g., Radua et al.,
012; Cooper et al., 2013) and it was noted that the method should
e conducted with caution in the case of more than two meta-
nalyses, as it may become too liberal. Conjunction analysis, on the
ther hand, becomes increasingly conservative in the case of more
han two individual meta-analyses.
.2.4. ROI analyses
We focused on ROI analyses to characterize the task-speciﬁc
atterns of activation underlying the main ﬁndings of our pooled-
nalysis. Therefore, we placed ROIs at the locations of peak voxels
rom our pooled analysis (highlighted in bold in Table 3). For large
lusters (temporo-parietal clusters, medial prefrontal cluster), we
dditionally placed ROIs at local subpeaks, according to the fol-
owing criteria: (i) Centers of all ROIs had a minimum distance of
0mm,which corresponds to the FWHMofmeta-analytic smooth-
ng. (ii) ROIs were placed in different functional-anatomical areas
r subdivisions of areas (e.g., the TPJ), as described by brain atlases.
or meta-analytic clusters that were found both in the left andhavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34
right hemisphere, we started with ROI selection on the right side,
and then chose closest possible peak or sub-peak on the homolo-
gous left coordinate. For the TPJ and the mPFC we relied on recent
connectivity-based parcellation atlases (Mars et al., 2011, 2012;
Sallet et al., 2013) for labeling our results and for selection of ROIs.
These atlases subdivide the TPJ and the mPFC based on patterns of
structural and functional connectivity (for details see Section 2.3).
For locating other ROIs in our analysis, such as precuneus and
fronto-temporal ROIs, we relied on classical macroanatomic atlas
boundaries (Talairach Daemon). The only exceptions to this proce-
dure were our ROIs in the anterior temporal lobes. We selected the
anterior temporal ROIs because theywere located close to the tem-
poral poles, for which we could not ﬁnd proper local subpeaks. For
one ﬁnding from our pooled meta-analysis, the left fusiform gyrus,
we did not analyze ROI data because of its closeness to another
ventral temporal ROI (left middle temporal ROI). For all ROIs, we
show boxplots that illustrate the distribution of effect-size esti-
mates within each task group. Additionally, we report the results
of the meta-analytic mean analysis for our ROIs, i.e., results from
the analysis thatwasdescribed earlier for calculatingmeta-analytic
mean maps. Signiﬁcance is reported with our default threshold of
p< .005, z>1. For interest, we also report statistical trends found at
a more liberal threshold of p< .05, z>1.
2.2.5. Task group comparisons
To test for differences between the meta-analyses of individ-
ual task groups, we carried out linear-models in ES-SDM. Linear
models calculate the difference between effect-size estimates from
two meta-analyses while taking into account differences in sample
size as well as within- and between study variability. This method
ensures that differences between groups are not driven by differ-
ences in sample size or heterogeneity between the meta-analyses.
We performed pairwise comparisons for all 15 combinations of the
six task groups in our main analysis. We focus our results on the
ROIs which were described in the last section. To account for the
multiple comparison problem, we corrected our default threshold
of p< .005, z>1 with the Bonferroni method, giving p< .00033, z>1.
For interest, we also report group differences that are signiﬁcant
only at the uncorrected default threshold p< .005, z>1.
2.3. Deﬁnition of TPJ and mPFC
Two of the most commonly mentioned brain structures in
theory of mind research are the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Both of these labels
are only poorly described by classical macroanatomic boundaries
and have been used somewhat inconsistently. To characterize
and discuss the results from our meta-analysis for the TPJ and
the mPFC we rely on recent atlases that map these areas and
their subregions based on structural connectivity proﬁles obtained
from diffusion weighted imaging. These atlases are available in
fslview (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslview/). Fig. 1 illustrates the
connectivity-parcellation clusters of the TPJ and the mPFC. Mars
et al. (2012) found that a more anterior connectivity cluster of
the TPJ, labeled as TPJa, is interconnected with the inferior frontal
gyrus, anterior insula and the SMA. A more posterior connectiv-
ity cluster, the TPJp, is interconnected with more dorsal-posterior
areas in the IPL, the precuneus, the ventral mPFC, and posterior
middle temporal areas. Yet another proﬁle was found for the con-
nectivity cluster in the IPL (dorsal to the TPJa and TPJp), which
is, for example, more strongly connected with lateral prefrontal
areas. The IPL connectivity cluster can again be subdivided into a
number of subclusters along a posterior-to-anterior gradient (Mars
et al., 2011). Most relevant for our work are connectivity cluster IPL
B, IPL C and IPL D, which lie directly above the TPJ connectivity
clusters. Sallet et al. (2013) used connectivity based parcellation
M. Schurz et al. / Neuroscience and Biobe
Fig. 1. Illustration of structural connectivity-based mappings of TPJ and mPFC. All
maps were thresholded at 25% of participants, so only voxels that belong to any
given mask in 25–100% of the participants are labeled. The TPJ was divided in pos-
terior (TPJp), anterior (TPJa), and dorsal (IPL) clusters by Mars et al. (2012). The IPL
connectivity cluster can again be subdivided into a number of subclusters (Mars
et al., 2011), most relevant for our work are connectivity cluster IPL B, IPL C and
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aPL D, which lie directly above the TPJ connectivity clusters. For the mPFC, we show
onnectivity clusters 1–4 derived from a parcellation of the frontal cortex by Sallet
t al. (2013).
o divide the medial frontal cortex into several connectivity clus-
ers. Most relevant for our results are medial frontal connectivity
lusters 2–4. Connectivity-cluster 2 corresponds to the pre-SMA
rea and shows strong connectivity to widespread areas in more
nterior medial prefrontal areas and in lateral prefrontal areas.
onnectivity-clusters 3 and 4 lie in themPFC, and cluster 4 lies ven-
ral to cluster 3. Both connectivity clusters 3 and 4 show strong a
inkage to areas throughout the medial prefrontal cortex, the pos-
erior cingulate gyrus, bilateral TPJ and anterior temporal lobes.
he most notable difference between connectivity clusters 3 and 4
s that only the more dorsally located cluster 3 shows connectiv-
ty to lateral prefrontal and premotor areas. All connectivity-based
tlases we used here were made only for the right hemisphere, and
o our knowledge, no corresponding parcellations exist for the left
ide. For labeling left hemispheric activations in our meta-analysis,
e therefore assumed a homologue parcellation on the left side as
or the right side.
. Results
.1. Individual meta-analyses
.1.1. False belief vs. photo
Neuroimaging studies have followed developmental psychol-
gy in using false belief stories as the prototypical problem for
heory of mind reasoning (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al.,
000).More recently, is has become apparent that the logical struc-
ure of false belief stories systematically differs from that of many
ontrol stories. This has been circumvented by introducing the so-
alled “false” photograph control story (Zaitchik, 1990). In this kind
f control condition, subjects are required to represent theoutdated
ontent of a physical representation such as a photograph or map.
e found 15 imaging studies that used the false belief > photo con-
rast,whichhadbeenﬁrst publishedbySaxe andKanwisher (2003).
xamples of this task are provided in Table 1 in the section ‘False
elief vs. photo’.
We performed a meta-analysis on the reported activation maps
or the contrast false belief vs. photo stories. Results are shown in
he sections ‘False belief vs. photo’ in Fig. 2 and Table 2. We found
he largest areas of convergence in left and right temporo-parietal
ortices. Activation peaks were located in the right posterior supe-
ior temporal gyrus corresponding to connectivity cluster TPJp, and
he left posterior middle temporal gyrus corresponding to connec-
ivity cluster IPL. Two large areas of convergent activation were
lso found in the precuneus and in the medial prefrontal cortex.havioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 13
The posterior area included parts of the bilateral precuneus and
posterior cingulate gyrus. The anterior area had its activation peak
on the border between mPFC connectivity clusters 3 and 4, and
extended to more ventral parts of the mPFC and anterior cingu-
late gyrus. Finally, an additional area of reliable activation was
found in the right anterior temporal lobe and adjacent parts of
the insula. Jackknife sensitivity analysis showed that all ﬁndings
of the meta-analysis were highly reproducible, and remained sig-
niﬁcant for 15/15 combinations of studies using the leave-one-out
method. Heterogeneity analysis found signiﬁcant between study
variance only for the peak in the precuneus, whereas all other ﬁnd-
ings showed no signiﬁcant variability across studies.
Eleven studies were excluded from the main analyses for the
sake of conceptual homogeneity or for methodological reasons.
Scholz et al. (2009) was excluded because only ROI data were
reported. Another study mixed judgments about false belief and
subjective preference (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2010). Other studies
relied on various nonverbal formats to study reasoning about false
belief, suchas comics, pictures andvideos. Someof themcontrasted
activation for false belief versus true belief reasoning (Hooker et al.,
2008; Rothmayr et al., 2011; Sommer et al., 2010; Grèzes et al.,
2004a, 2004b, 2006; see also Schuwerk et al., in press), while oth-
ers contrasted false belief reasoning with reasoning about physical
reality (Doehnel et al., 2012; Marjoram et al., 2006; Samson et al.,
2004). Unfortunately, nonverbal false belief studies were too few
in number and too heterogeneous to form a separate task group.
In particular, the contrast false belief versus true belief reason-
ing would deserve a separate task group because of its conceptual
uniqueness.
Another 10 studies usedmethodologically less stringent control
conditions and story-based formats to test false belief. We report
them in a separate meta-analysis in Supplementary Materials S2.
In general, meta-analytic ﬁndings for this task category were less
robust compared toﬁndings for the falsebelief vs. photo.Oneexpla-
nation for these weaker ﬁndings may be that heterogeneity and
methodological variability for these studies was much larger than
for the false belief vs. photo. For example, some studies presented
relatively long text passages with plenty of information with no
relevance for belief-reasoning (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995). Includ-
ing these studies in our main analysis would therefore introduce
substantial variance which may not be due to clearly identiﬁable
conceptual differences between tasks, but rather due to haphazard
methodological differences.
3.1.2. Trait Judgments
Inspired by former ﬁndings of brain areas specialized for con-
ceptual knowledge about different classes of inanimate objects
(e.g., tools, houses), early studies presenting trait judgment tasks
aimed at ﬁnding specialized brain areas for conceptual knowledge
about persons (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2002). Since then, trait judg-
ment tasks have been very popular in the ﬁeld. Common to all
studies in this group, the experimental task contains written mate-
rialwhich provides information about traits of a person (adjectives,
opinions, or personal episodes). The section ‘Trait Judgments’ in
Table 1 gives examples. In most of the studies, the described per-
sonwasnot visible; however, three studies presented aphotograph
of the face of the target person. Different types of control tasks
were used in studies of trait judgments. In a number of control
tasks attention was diverted away from mental state processing
by asking for a lexical judgment on a personality trait word (e.g.,
Is this word written in upper- or lower-case?). Other control tasks
contained words or statements which had no mental-state related
content.
We performed a meta-analysis on the reported activations
for contrasts of trait-diagnostic information processing >no
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Table 1
Examples from each task-group in our meta-analysis.
Author Img. Experimental task Control task
False belief vs. photo (3 out of 15 studies, for more information see Supplementary Table S1.1)
Aichhorn (2009) fMRI
n=21
Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Predict the behavior of that person based on her
belief. e.g., ‘Julia sees the ice cream van go to the lake. She
doesn’t see that the van turns off to the town hall.
Therefore, Julia will look for the ice cream van at the . . .?’
(lake or town hall).
Read a short vignette involving a photograph of the
past, and a description how things shown on the photo
have changed by now. Answer a question about the
outdated scene shown on the photo. e.g., ‘Julia takes a
picture of the ice-van in front of the pond. The ice cream
van changes to the market place; the picture gets
developed. On the picture, the ice-van is at the . . .?’ (pond
or market place).
Saxe (2003) fMRI
n=21
Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Answer a question about her belief. e.g., ‘John
told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a
Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars so she
believed John. When Emily sees John’s car, she thinks it is
a . . .?’ (Porsche or Ford).
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo. e.g., ‘A
photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree
branch. The ﬁlm took half an hour to develop. In the
meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground.
The developed photograph shows the apple on the . . .?
(tree or ground).’
Lee (2011) fMRI
n=26
Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Answer a question about her belief. e.g., ‘David
knows that Ethan is very scared of spiders. Ethan, alone in
the attic, sees a shadow move and thinks it is a burglar.
David hears Ethan cry for help. David assumes that Ethan
thinks he has seen . . .?’ (a spider or a burglar).
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo. e.g.,
‘Amy made a drawing of a treehouse three years ago. That
was before the storm. We built a new treehouse last
summer, but we painted it red instead of blue. The
treehouse in Amy’s drawing is . . .? (red or blue).’
Trait judgments (3 out of 15 studies, see Supplementary Table S1.2)
Ma (2011) fMRI
n=30
Read written statements conveying trait diagnostic
information about persons (describing behavior). Then
read a single trait-adjective and indicate whether it is
consistent with the behavior of that person. e.g., ‘Tolvan
gave her sister a hug . . . consistent with “friendly”?’
Read written statement about a person doing
something. This behavior is neutral and does not
convey trait diagnostic information about the person.
Indicate the gender of the person in the sentence. e.g.,
‘Tolvan gave her mother a bottle . . . is Tolvan male or
female?’
Mitchell (2002) fMRI
n=34
Read an adjective. Indicate whether it can be true for a
hypothetical person. e.g., ”’nervous” . . . can it be true for
“David?”?’
Read an adjective. Indicate whether it can be true for
an object. e.g., ”’sundried” . . . can it be true for “grape”?’
Zhu (2007) fMRI
n=13
Read a personality trait adjective (e.g., brave, childish)
and indicate if it correctly describes a former American
president (Bill Clinton).
Read a personality trait adjective (e.g., brave, childish)
and indicate if it is written in lower- or upper-case.
Strategic games (3 out of 9 studies, see Supplementary Table S1.3)
Gallagher (2002) PET
n=9
Play “stone, paper, scissors” with a human opponent.
Select one option (e.g., stone). After that, the option of
your opponent is shown. The winner gets rewarded
(winner is determined by a set of rules, e.g., stone beats
scissors).
Play “stone, paper, scissors” with a computer. You are
informed that the computer chooses by a simple
algorithm. Select one option.
Kircher (2009) fMRI
n=14
Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated version).
You play with a human player for game points. Both
players choose a cooperative or defective strategy on
each trial. If both players choose defective, they gain
almost no game points at all. If both choose
cooperative, both gain some game points. If players
choose differently, the defective player gains more
points.
Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated version).
You play with a computer.
Sripada (2009) fMRI
n=26
Play a game like the ultimatum game (iterated version)
with a human opponent. Two players must share an
amount of money. Player 1 makes an offer how to split
the amount, and player 2 can accept (both receive their
share) or decline (no one receives money).
Play a game like the ultimatum game (iterated version)
with a computer.
Social animations (3 out of 14 studies, see Supplementary Table S1.4)
Blakemore (2003) fMRI
n=10
Watch a video animation of two interacting triangles
(e.g., surprising one another). Answer questions
concerning the contingency (e.g., is there an intention?)
between movements of the two shapes.
Watch video animation of two interacting triangles
(e.g., surprising one another). Answer questions
concerning the physical movement of the ﬁrst shape
(e.g., did the velocity change?).
Castelli (2000) PET
n=6
Watch a video animation of two interacting triangles
(e.g., mother and child are playing). Explain verbally
what was happening (after fMRI).
Watch video animation of two randomly moving
triangles. Explain verbally what was happening (after
fMRI).
Martin (2003) fMRI
n=12
Watch a video animation of simple geometrical shapes
depicting a social interaction. Indicate which action
was depicted – select a word from several alternatives
(e.g., dancing, ﬁshing, sharing. . .).
Watch a video animation of simple geometrical shapes
depicting a mechanical action. Indicate which action
was depicted – select a word from several alternatives
(e.g., billiards, bowling. . .).
Mind in the eyes (3 out of 10 studies, for more information see Supplementary Table S1.5)
Baron-Cohen (1999) fMRI
n=12
View photographs of eyes. Indicate which of two
words (e.g., concerned versus unconcerned) describes
the mental state of that person.
View photographs of eyes. Indicate if the person is
male or female.
Mitchell (2005b) fMRI
n=18
View photograph of a face. Indicate how pleased the
person was about being pictured.
View Photograph of a face. Indicate how symmetrical
the face is.
Platek (2004) fMRI
n=5
View photographs of eyes. Think about the mental
state of the person depicted (no response).
View a ﬁxation cross (no response).
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author Img. Experimental task Control task
Rational Actions (3 out of 10 studies, see Supplementary Table S1.6)
Brunet (2000) fMRI
n=8
View a cartoon story and predict what will happen
based on intentions of a character (no false belief).
Choose a logical story ending from several options
shown in pictures. e.g., A prisoner is in his cell. First, he
breaks the bars of his prison window. Then he walks to his
bed. Participants must indicate what will happen next . . .
the prisoner ties a rope from the sheets on his bed/the
prisoner shouts out loud.
View a cartoon story and predict what will happen
based on physical causality. Choose a logical story
ending from several options shown in pictures. e.g., A
person is standing in front of a slide. A large ball is coming
down this slide, heading toward the person standing
there. Participants must indicate what will happen next
. . . the ball is knocking over the person/the ball is resting
on the ground and the person is standing next to it.
Villareal (2012) fMRI
n=19
You see a photograph of a person performing a gesture
involving a symbolic connotation (e.g., asking for the
bill in a restaurant). Indicate if a gesture was shown and
what it was expressing. (e.g., asking for the
bill/hitchhiking on the road/nothing).
You see a photograph of a person simply sitting or
standing (e.g., sitting in a restaurant). Indicate if a
gesture was shown and what it was expressing. (e.g.,
asking for the bill/hitchhiking on the road/nothing).
Walter (2004) (exp 1) fMRI
n=13
View a cartoon story showing two persons. One is
making a communicative gesture (e.g., is pointing to a
bottle to request it). Choose a logical story ending from
s.
View a cartoon story showing some objects making
contact because of physical causality (e.g., a gust of
wind blows a ball, so it knocks over several bottles).
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rait-diagnostic information processing. Sections ‘Trait Judgments’
n Fig. 2 and Table 2 summarize the results. A medial prefrontal
rea showed absolute highest convergence, with its peak in mPFC
onnectivity cluster 3. The area extended ventrally to mPFC con-
ectivity cluster 4, and dorsal-posteriorly to connectivity cluster
. Another area of convergent activation was found in the poste-
ior cingulate and parts of the precuneus. Convergence was also
ound in the temporo-parietal cortices, with activation peaks in the
ight posterior superior temporal gyrus corresponding to connec-
ivity cluster TPJp, and the left posterior middle temporal gyrus
orresponding to connectivity cluster IPL. In addition, two areas
f convergent activation were found in bilateral anterior temporal
obes. Jackknife sensitivity analysis showed high replicability for
ilateral temporo-parietal ﬁndings (14/15 combinations left, 15/15
ight), medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate ﬁndings (15/15
ombinations for both peaks). The left anterior temporal ﬁnding
lso showed high replicability (15/15), whereas the right anterior
emporal peak could only be reproduced for 11/15 combinations.
eterogeneity analysis found signiﬁcant between study variance
or all left hemispheric areas (left anterior temporal, left temporo-
arietal) and for the posterior cingulate, which indicates that these
reas may be activated in some trait judgment tasks more strongly
han in others. No signiﬁcant variance was found for the ﬁndings
n the medial prefrontal, right temporo-parietal and right anterior
emporal cortices.
Twelve studies were excluded from the main analyses of trait
udgments. Some studies contrasted activation for other versus
elf-related judgments (Blackwood et al., 2003; D’Argembeau et al.,
007; Gutchess et al., 2007; Vanderwal et al., 2008) or used another
orm of mental state judgment as a comparison condition (Cloutier
t al., 2011; Ray et al., 2010; Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). Other stud-
es only reported activation for self-related judgments (Schroeter
t al., 2010) or reported activation for a mix between self- and
ther related judgments (Lombardo et al., 2010; Modinos et al.,
009). Pfeifer et al. (2007) was excluded because this study used
assive rest as a control condition. Heberlein and Saxe (2005) pre-
ented a kind of social animation and asked for a trait judgment.We
xcluded this task from our analysis because it could not be clearly
ssigned to one of our task groups (i.e., trait judgments or social
nimations). One PET study included in our meta-analysis (Craik
t al., 1999) reported extremely high effect-sizes (highest t-values
100) obtained from a sample of only 6 participants. Because we
ould not clarify if these effect-sizes were determined by a ran-
omeffects analysis, we replaced them in our meta-analysis by the
oftware default for missing values.Choose a logical story ending from three options
shown in pictures.
3.1.3. Strategic games
Researchers asked participants in the scanner to play a game
with another person. The hypothesis was that feedback from a
social partner – indicated by her moves in the game – is spon-
taneously used to infer her intentions, even if participants are
not explicitly told to mindread (Rilling et al., 2004). Then, brain
activation measured during strategic games was compared with
activation found in studies that explicitly asked for a judgment
about mental states, such as false belief. Overlaps in activation
were taken to support the hypothesis of an “intentional stance”
(e.g., Dennett, 1971), i.e., that people have a disposition to reason
about the beliefs, desires and intentions of others to predict behav-
ior (Gallagher et al., 2002). In all strategic games reviewed here,
participants were asked to play a game where they could com-
pete or cooperate with another player. Section ‘Strategic Games’ in
Table 1 gives examples. Players could not see each other, but they
were told about the decision of the other player in the game. The
most popular game used by these studies is the classic prisoner’s
dilemma. In all experimental tasks, the other player was human. In
the control tasks, the other player was a computer (e.g., following
a simple algorithm).
A meta-analysis was performed on the reported activations for
contrasts of playing with a human>playing with a computer. See
‘Strategic Games’ in Fig. 2 and Table 2 for results. The largest area
was found in the mPFC with its peak in mPFC connectivity cluster
3. The area extended to the anterior cingulate gyrus ventrally and
the right posterior frontal cortex (mPFC connectivity cluster 5) lat-
erally. Another large area was found in the anterior cingulate gyrus
and thalamus. Furthermore, we found activation in a right poste-
rior middle temporal area, with subpeaks in connectivity clusters
IPL and TPJa. A smaller area was also found in the left fusiform
gyrus. Jackknife sensitivity analyses showed high replicability for
all ﬁndings (9/9 combinations) except for the fusiform area, where
the peak was only replicated in 6 out of 9 combinations. Hetero-
geneity analysis found no signiﬁcant between-study variability for
the main ﬁndings of the meta-analysis of strategic games.
We excluded 7 studies from the meta-analysis of strategic
games. Tomlin et al. (2006) was excluded because they only
reported ROI data. Bhatt and Camerer (2005) and Krill and Platek
(2012) used control conditions which likely engaged reasoning
about mental states. Other studies, using low-level control con-
ditions (Decety et al., 2004; Elliott et al., 2006; Rilling et al., 2008),
were excluded for the sake of homogeneity. Another group of stud-
ies were excluded because they did not use a subtraction design
with activation and control tasks, but computational modeling
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t al., 2010).
.1.4. Social animations
Social animationswere introducedbecause researchers (Castelli
t al., 2000, 2002) sought for a low-level stimulus that provides
n alternative to the high-level verbal or cartoon-based materials
hat predominated the ﬁeld in the beginning (e.g., Baron-Cohen
t al., 1994; Fletcher et al., 1995; Happé et al., 1996). The idea
as to investigate whether theory of mind areas found in ear-ier verbal studies could also be triggered by a very minimalistic
nd low-level input, which was aimed at showing the existence of
dedicated neurocognitive mechanism for mental-state attribu-
ion. Studies in this category presented video animations of simplevalues from statistical permutation testing (z-values). Maps were thresholded at
geometrical shapes, which were introduced by Heider and Simmel
(1944). The section ‘Social animations’ in Table 1 gives examples.
The majority of studies in this category used the following exper-
imental paradigm: In the experimental task, a movie showed a
number of geometrical shapes (e.g., two triangles), moving across
the display. The movements portrayed actions which are typical
for an intentional or social interaction. In the control condition, a
movie showed geometrical shapes in randomor purelymechanical
movements (e.g., resembling the movement of billiard balls on the
table). For each movie, participants were asked to explain/decide if
an interactionwas portrayed. A few studies in this category showed
similarmovies in theactivationandcontrol tasks, butuseddifferent
instructions. In the experimental task, participants were asked to
focus on the social interactions shown in the movies. In the control
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Table 2
Results of meta-analyses for individual task groups.
Label Cluster center z-val. vx JK Het Individual foci Label
x y z x y z
False belief vs. photo (15 studies)
R precuneus (BA 7) 8 −59 35 6.50 1407 15 2.83 4 −42 35 R cingulate
−1 −49 25 L post. cingulate
0 −42 35 cingulate
0 −62 33 precuneus
R sup. temporal (BA 39, TPJp) 56 −56 25 13.22 887 15 n.s. 56 −47 24 R supra./IPL B
58 −52 42 R inf. par./IPL D, C
45 −59 39 R angular/IPL D, E
55 −67 15 R mid. temp./–
R insula (BA 13) 49 −8 −11 3.36 628 15 n.s. 51 −9 −7 R sup. temporal
61 −16 −15 R mid. temporal
51 −15 −26 R sub-gyral
40 −16 −15 R caudate
46 −28 −21 R fusiform
L mid. temporal (BA 39, IPL D) −55 −65 27 8.44 960 15 n.s. −44 −61 40 L angular/IPL E, D
−50 −61 45 L inf. par./IPL D, E
−59 −56 31 L sup. temp./TPJp
−50 −47 28 L supra./TPJp
L sup. frontal (BA9, cl 3, 4) −7 58 21 6.29 2095 15 n.s. 9 48 −14 R ant. cing./–
6 50 31 R med. front./cl 3
−1 51 −7 L ant. cing./–
−3 54 28 L med. front./cl 3
6 58 25 R sup. front./cl 3
Trait judgments (15 studies)
R sup. temporal (BA 39, TPJp) 47 −56 20 2.23 169 14 n.s. 47 −78 34 R mid. temp./–
54 −68 35 R angular/IPL D
R sup. temporal (BA 38) 44 8 −26 2.00 33 11 n.s.
R med. front. (BA 9, cl 3) 6 51 24 4.38 2276 15 n.s. −1 52 31 L med. front./cl 3
−1 54 6 L med. front./cl 4
3 49 −3 R ant. cing./–
−1 54 6 L ant. cing./cl 4
−5 33 53 L sup. front./cl 2
8 33 53 R sup. front./cl 2
L mid. temporal (BA 39, IPL D) −55 −65 27 2.28 330 15 2.72 −57 −70 26 L mid. temp./–
−50 −59 25 L supra./TPJp
L post cingulate (BA 31) −3 −56 26 3.64 970 15 6.26 −11 −65 24 L precuneus
4 −54 23 R post. cingulate
4 −53 34 R precuneus
L mid. temporal (BA 21) −57 −9 −21 2.82 417 15 3.18 −49 −14 −25 L sub-gyral
−51 −7 −25 L inf. temporal
−53 −4 −14 L sup. temporal
Strategic Games (9 studies)
R mid. temp. (BA 19, –) 48 −60 16 3.14 422 9 n.s. 50 −46 24 R inf. par./TPJa
58 −62 28 R sup. temp./IPL D
L fusiform (BA 19) −34 −70 −14 2.14 241 6 n.s. −36 −84 −14 L inf. occipital
−42 −70 −20 L cerebellum
L ant. cing. (–) −2 2 −4 2.58 657 9 n.s. −10 −20 4 L thalamus
2 2 −4 R ant. cingulate
16 −16 0 R thalamus
12 −2 −6 R glob. pallidus
L med. front. (BA 32, cl 3) −2 46 26 4.53 1494 9 n.s. 4 46 28 R med. front./cl 3
−8 40 0 L ant. cing./–
18 48 32 R sup. front./cl 5
Social animations (14 studies)
R sup. temporal (BA 13, TPJa) 53 −31 9 4.55 1664 14 n.s. 53 −62 3 R mid. temp./–
62 −63 −6 R inf. temp./–
64 −51 24 R supra./TPJp
51 −53 −16 R fusiform/–
58 −48 13 R sup. temp./–
55 −34 2 R sup. temp./–
40 −33 −4 R caudate/–
49 −23 10 R trans. temporal/–
R thalamus 12 −13 −1 2.78 98 11 n.s. 8 −23 4 R thalamus
R sup. temporal (BA 21) 57 −4 −16 3.06 141 14 4.54 57 −6 −23 R mid. temporal
59 −5 −30 R mid. temporal
R inf. frontal (BA 45) 57 29 14 2.76 54 10 3.12 57 22 10 R inf. frontal
R med. frontal (BA 8, cl 3) 6 59 32 2.66 10 8 n.s.
L cerebellum −23 −76 −28 2.79 13 9 n.s.
L cerebellum −31 −45 −20 4.11 704 14 n.s. −49 −53 −14 L fusiform
−47 −31 −23 L fusiform
L mid. temporal (BA 21) −62 −15 −13 4.10 1292 14 n.s. −55 −66 10 L mid. temp./–
−65 −45 28 L supra./TPJa
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Table 2 (Continued)
Label Cluster center z-val. vx JK Het Individual foci Label
x y z x y z
−59 −51 13 L sup. temp./–
−48 −37 20 L insula/TPJa
−61 −34 7 L sup. temp./TPJa
−60 −10 −9 L mid. temp./–
−66 −7 −21 L inf. temp./–
L mid. frontal (BA 46) −46 23 19 3.29 297 14 n.s. −44 15 8 L insula
−44 22 7 L inf. frontal
−57 39 10 L mid. frontal
Mind in the eyes (10 studies)
R mid. temporal (BA 19, –) 56 −63 16 3.31 311 9 n.s. 55 −64 3 R mid. temp./–
58 −60 21 R sup. temp./TPJp
47 −36 9 R sup. temp./TPJa
R inf. frontal (BA 45) 47 22 6 2.79 28 8 n.s. 42 19 0 R insula
R inf. frontal (BA 9) 60 25 19 2.38 11 5 n.s.
L mid. temporal (BA 37, –) −51 −62 5 4.84 655 10 n.s. −55 −66 12 L mid. temp./–
−63 −57 16 L sup. temp./TPJp
−53 −53 −12 L inf. temp./–
−51 −43 −13 L fusiform/–
−44 −32 8 L sup. temp./–
L cingulate gyrus (BA 24, –) −5 8 42 3.75 655 10 n.s. −3 6 49 L med. front./–
8 7 51 R med. front./cl 1
−13 14 59 L sup. front./cl 1,2
6 17 47 R sup. front./–
−9 27 40 L cing./–
L inf. frontal (BA 45) −46 24 7 5.27 1465 10 n.s. −37 3 38 L precentral
−48 11 51 L mid. frontal
−55 7 11 L inf. frontal
−55 16 17 L inf. frontal
−42 17 8 L insula
−46 26 27 L mid. frontal
−51 37 −12 L inf. frontal
Rational actions (10 studies)
R precuneus (BA 7) 6 −48 38 3.64 894 10 n.s. −5 −60 31 L precuneus
6 −59 10 R post. cingulate
10 −53 32 R cingulate
−3 −50 18 L post. cingulate
R mid. temporal (BA 21, –) 60 −45 6 3.57 593 10 n.s. 53 −68 12 R mid. temp./–
53 −53 11 R sup. temp./–
58 −41 19 R sup. temp./TPJa
64 −38 3 R mid. temp./–
R mid. temporal (BA 21) 59 −11 −25 3.54 545 10 n.s. 64 −20 −10 R mid. temporal
57 −12 −36 R inf. temporal
57 1 −15 R sup. temporal
48 6 −33 R mid. temporal
L mid. temporal (BA 39, IPL E) −50 −65 23 3.74 1242 10 n.s. −55 −49 35 L supra./TPJp
−50 −56 29 L sup. temp./IPL C, E
−61 −34 9 L sup. temp./TPJa
−59 −16 −2 L sup. temp./–
−55 −4 −14 L mid. temp./–
L sup. frontal (BA 9, cl 4) −1 62 23 2.16 31 7 n.s.
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tK, number of subsamples in jackknife analysis that could reproduce ﬁnding.
et, signiﬁcance of between-study heterogeneity test.
ask, participants had to focus on the mechanical properties of the
eometrical shapes (e.g., indicate if the velocity of the movement
ad changed).
The meta-analysis for this category was based on contrasts
etween social or intentional interactions >physical movements.
esults are summarized in the sections ‘Social Animations’ in Fig. 2
nd Table 2. We found the largest areas of convergence in bilat-
ral temporo-parietal cortices. The right area had its activation
eak in connectivity cluster TPJa in the connectivity-based par-
ellation scheme, and also covered parts of connectivity cluster
PJp. On the left side, activations were only found in connectivity
luster TPJa. Other areas of convergence were found in the right
nterior temporal lobe, left cerebellum, and left middle/inferior
rontal gyrus. Smaller areas of convergence were found in the right
halamus, right inferior frontal gyrus and in medial prefrontal cor-
ex (connectivity cluster 3). Jackknife sensitivity analyses showedhigh reproducibility formain ﬁndings in bilateral temporo-parietal
areas, the right anterior temporal lobe, the left middle/inferior
frontal gyrus and the left cerebellum (signiﬁcance remained in
14/14 combinations). Lower replicability was found for ﬁndings
in the right thalamus (11/14), right inferior frontal gyrus (10/14)
and the right medial prefrontal cortex (8/14). Heterogeneity anal-
ysis found signiﬁcant between-study variance for the ﬁndings in
the right anterior temporal lobe and in the right inferior frontal
gyrus.We excluded ﬁve studies from the meta-analysis of social
animations. Two studies were excluded because they did not
report activation coordinates (Scheibel et al., 2011; Schultz et al.,
2003). Three studies used animations which portrayed only causal
relations between mechanically moving objects, but no social con-
tent (Blakemore et al., 2001; Fonlupt, 2003; Straube et al., 2011).
Because of a similar issue as described in the previous section Trait
Judgments, we replaced extremely high effect sizes reported in one
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mall-sampled study (Castelli et al., 2000) by the software default
or missing values.
.1.5. Mind in the eyes
The mind in the eyes task was used in fMRI as an attempt
o dissociate brain mechanisms subserving general intelligence
rom those dedicated to social intelligence (Baron-Cohen et al.,
999). Thiswas based onﬁndings that adultswith high-functioning
utism(Baron-Cohenet al., 1997) aswell asparentsof childrenwith
utism (Baron-Cohen and Hammer, 1997) showed deﬁcits on the
ind in the eyes task, but not children with William’s syndrome
Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998). Hence, the task was considered as
n advanced theory of mind test involving mind-reading (Baron-
ohen et al., 1999). Examples for the task are provided in Table 1.
lmost all studies in this category used the following experimental
aradigm: In the experimental task, participants saw a photograph
f a pair of eyes. In addition, two mental state adjectives were
hown. Participants were asked to indicate which mental-state
djective best describes the expression in the eyes on the photo.
he control task also presented a pair of eyes, however, participants
ere simply asked to indicate the gender or age of the person dis-
layed. A few studies falling into this category showed a complete
ace on the photo, or a video of a pair of eyes. Again, a mental state
udgment was compared to a judgment about physical properties
n these studies.
A meta-analysis was performed on the reported activations for
ontrastsofmental state judgments >physical judgments (e.g., gen-
er, age), see sections ‘Mind in the Eyes’ in Fig. 2 and Table 2. A
eft inferior frontal area, with a peak BA 45, showed the highest
ctivation in the map. The area also contained parts of left precen-
ral and middle frontal gyri, as well as in left insula. In the right
emisphere, two smaller lateral prefrontal areas were found in the
nferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis (BAs 9 and 45). Further areas
f convergent activation across studieswere found in bilateral pos-
erior temporal cortices. The left temporal area was substantially
arger compared to the right. Both areas had their activation peaks
n the posterior middle temporal gyri, and covered connectivity
lusters TPJp (left and right side) and TPJa (right side). The left tem-
oral area further extended to the inferior temporal and fusiform
yri ventrally. Finally, an area was found in the middle cingulate
yrus, corresponding to mPFC connectivity clusters 1 and cluster
(pre-SMA). Jackknife-sensitivity analysis found perfect replica-
ility for the left temporo-parietal, left middle cingulate and left
nferior frontal ﬁndings, and good replicability (9/10 combinations
emained signiﬁcant) for the right temporo-parietal ﬁnding. Lower
eplicability was found for the right inferior frontal ﬁndings (8/10
nd 5/10). Heterogeneity analysis found no signiﬁcant between-
tudy variance for the ﬁndings of the meta-analysis on mind in the
yes tasks.
Four other studies found in the literature were not included
n our meta-analysis. Péron et al. (2010) and Baglio et al. (2012)
nly reported data for patient populations. Mier et al. (2010) and
chulte-Rüther et al. (2011) were excluded because they did not
sk for mental states but for basic emotions in their judgments.
.1.6. Rational actions
The initial idea of studies falling into the category rational
ctions was to produce a non-verbal alternative to false belief
tories, which also requires attributing intentions to the protag-
nist of a story. Another difference is that tasks are not about
alse belief but rational action goals. Similar to the idea behind the
ocial animations task, comic-stripswereused to seewhether brain
reas dedicated to mental-state attribution responded irrespective
f stimulus input (Brunet et al., 2000). Moreover, the non-verbal
ormatwasused in imaging studiesof theoryofmind in schizophre-
ia, as it circumvents problems linked to speech disorganization inhavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 19
some patients (Brunet et al., 2003; Sarfati et al., 1997). All tasks
in our meta-analysis had non-verbal material. Examples for tasks
are given in Table 1, section ‘Rational actions’. In the experimental
tasks, participants were asked a question about the goal of these
actions, e.g., to predict the likely outcome. The correct answer cor-
responded to the rational (i.e., ordinary) goal pursued by these
simple actions. In the control tasks, questions about non-mental
aspects of the scenes were asked (e.g., about physical causality).
We performed a meta-analysis of the reported activations
for contrasts between inferring action goals > inferring physical
causality. Results can be found in the sections ‘Rational actions’
of Fig. 2 and Table 2. Large areas of convergence were found
in bilateral temporo-parietal cortices, with activation peaks in
connectivity clusters IPL, TPJp and TPJa on the left side, and
TPJa on the right side. Other large areas of convergence were
in the precuneus/posterior cingulate and in right anterior tem-
poral lobe. In addition, we found a small area of convergence
in mPFC connectivity cluster 4. Jackknife sensitivity analysis
showed high replicability for bilateral temporo-parietal, right
anterior temporal and precuneus ﬁndings (10/10 combinations
remained signiﬁcant), and lower replicability for the ﬁnding in the
medial prefrontal cortex (7/10). Heterogeneity analysis found no
signiﬁcant between-study variance for rational actions.
We did not include 5 other studies found in the literature. Two
studies (Brunet et al., 2003; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007) reported data
that had already been used in other studies in our meta-analysis
(so there was a problem of dependent samples). Brüne et al. (2011)
only reported data for a patient population. German et al. (2004)
and Saxe et al. (2004a, 2004b) only asked participants to passively
watch human actions, and did not ask about goals or end-states.
3.1.7. Summarizing convergent activations across task groups
The ﬁrst strategy we used to summarize the meta-analytic
results across task groups was a pooled meta-analysis over all
studies in our sample. This corresponds to the approach taken by
previous voxel-based meta-analyses of theory of mind. Table 3 and
Fig. 3A show results of the pooled meta-analysis. Consistent with
previous work (e.g., Bzdok et al., 2012; Mar, 2011) we found con-
vergent activation along the entire stretch of the bilateral temporal
lobes and parts of the bilateral inferior parietal lobuli. Activation
peaks were located in the left and right superior temporal gyri cor-
responding to connectivity clusters TPJp. We found further areas
in the bilateral superior temporal gyri corresponding to connectiv-
ity clusters TPJa, and in the bilateral angular gyri corresponding to
connectivity clusters IPL. In addition, we also found large areas of
convergent activation in the precuneus and in the mPFC. The pre-
cuneus showed activation in both hemispheres and had its peak
on the right side. The frontal area had its peak in mPFC connectiv-
ity cluster 3 and extended ventrally to connectivity cluster 4 and
dorsal-posteriorly to connectivity cluster 2/pre-SMA. Furthermore,
relatively small areas of convergencewere found in the left inferior
frontal gyrus and in the left fusiform gyrus. Also the right inferior
frontal gyrus showed convergent activation, which was subsumed
under the large right temporal area.
Jackknife sensitivity analysis showed that all of the main ﬁnd-
ings (L and R TPJp, mPFC connectivity cluster 3, precuneus, left
inferior frontal gyrus) remained signiﬁcant in 73 out of 73 combi-
nations of studies using the leave-one-outmethod.Only thepeak in
the left fusiform gyrus showed less replicability (remained signif-
icant in 63 out of 73 analyses). In contrast, heterogeneity analysis
showed signiﬁcant variance across studies for all of the main ﬁnd-
ings.Highandsigniﬁcantheterogeneitywas found in theprecuneus
(z=9.08), left (z=5.82) and right (z=8.83) connectivity cluster TPJp,
and in mPFC connectivity cluster 3 (z=5.29).
Next, we characterized the overlap between task groups by
means of conjunction analysis. As described in themethods section,
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Table 3
Results of pooled meta-analysis.
Label Cluster center z-val. vx JK Het Individual foci Label
x y z x y z
R precuneus (BA 7) 4 −55 34 6.58 1171 73 9.08 15 −68 29 R precuneus
−9 −68 29 L precuneus
0 −55 34 R precuneus
15 −53 36 R precuneus
R sup. temp. (BA 22, TPJp) 56 −56 18 7.96 2446 73 8.83 56 −72 31 R mid. temp./–
47 −61 39 R angular/IPL E, D
64 −52 −3 R mid. temp./–
56 −47 24 R supramarg./IPL B
47 −35 12 R sup. temp./TPJa
40 −35 12 R insula/–
57 −28 −21 R inf. temp./–
62 −22 −10 R mid. temp./–
57 −9 −23 R mid. temp./–
53 0 −21 R sup. temp./–
49 24 6 R inf. front.
55 21 −1 R precentral
L sup. temp. (BA 22, IPL D/TPJp) −53 −59 20 7.21 1980 73 5.82 −50 −77 29 L mid. temp./–
−46 −63 41 L angular/IPL E, D
−66 −52 2 L mid. temp./–
−52 −47 26 L supramarg./–
−57 −35 20 L insula/IPL B
−53 −30 10 L sup. temp./TPJa
−59 −23 −8 L mid. temp./–
−60 −15 −13 L mid. temp./–
−51 0 −19 L mid. temp./–
L fusiform (BA 37) −51 −46 −8 3.36 14 63 n.s.
L inf. frontal (BA 13) −44 27 0 4.40 389 73 0.10 −44 15 8 L insula
−48 21 19 L inf. frontal
−46 22 8 L inf. frontal
L sup. frontal (BA 9, cl 3) −1 56 24 7.74 2295 73 5.29 −16 56 26 L sup. frontal/cl 3
3 51 −7 R ant. cingulate/cl 4
−20 48 36 L sup. front./–
−7 43 52 L sup. front./cl 3
6 26 55 R sup. front./cl 2
−5 17 52 L sup. frontal/cl2
JK, number of subsamples in jackknife analysis that could reproduce ﬁnding.
Het, signiﬁcance of between-study heterogeneity test; Regions highlighted in bold entered our ROI analysis.
Table 4
Results of conjunction and overlap analyses.
# Label Cluster center BA z-val. vx Individual foci Label
x y z x y z
Conjunction (simple overlap) of 6 individual task group meta-analyses
1 R mid. temp./TPJp 49 −56 19 21 2.15 69 49 −61 20 R mid. temp./IPLE
44 −55 18 R mid. temp./–
56 −55 23 R sup. temp./TPJp
Conjunction (simple overlap) between two halves of the pooled sample–repeated 10 times with permutation of studies
1 R mid. temp./IPLD 51 −60 20 39 3.66 327 55 −68 12 R mid. temp./–
48 −58 30 R angular/TPJp
64 −46 8 R mid. temp./–
60 −43 26 R supramarg./TPJa
2 L mid. temp./– −55 −59 19 21 3.58 162 −54 −65 11 L mid. temp./–
−59 −53 25 L supramarg./TPJp
−57 −46 14 L mid. temp./–
3 L med. front./– −1 54 25 10 3.64 257 −3 51 40 L med. front./cl3
−7 60 37 L med. front./cl3
−2 61 20 L med. front./cl4
Multimodal meta-analysis of 6 task groups
1 R sup. temp./TPJp 62 −58 20 39 2.78 184 58 −66 10 R mid. temp./–
55 −61 16 R mid. temp./–
56 −55 27 R sup. temp./TPJp
2 L sup. temp./TPJp −55 −59 20 22 2.59 76 −50 −56 26 L sup. temp./TPJp
−52 −47 26 L supram./TPJp
3 L med. front./cl 3 −1 54 33 8 1.48 156 −3 44 35 L med. front./cl3
−4 50 39 L med. front./cl3
−2 62 24 L med. front./cl4
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Fig. 3. (A) Results of a pooled meta-analysis including all studies from every task group. (B) Results of a conservative conjunction analysis of the six separate meta-analyses.
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lC) Results of a statistically powerful permutation-based overlap analysis of the six
eta-analyses. All results were thresholded at voxel-wise threshold of p< .005 unc
e followed three strategies to characterize the overlap between
ndings for our task groups. First we calculated a simple conjunc-
ion overlap between signiﬁcant ﬁndings for the six individual task
roups (Fig. 3B). This procedure shows ﬁndings which are individ-
ally signiﬁcant in all six meta-analyses at our default threshold of
< .005 uncorrected, z>1, and minimum cluster extent 10 voxels.
e found only one cluster of consistent activation in our conjunc-
ion analysis, which was centered in the right posterior middle
emporal gyrus corresponding to connectivity cluster TPJp. This
rea comprised 69 voxels and extended to parts of the posterior
uperior temporal gyrus.
Our second strategy of calculating the overlap between task
roups was a permutation-based overlap analysis, repeated ten
imes for different permutations. Conjunction analysis of all ten
verlap images showed three areas of consistent activation. Results
re reported in Fig. 3C and Table 4. The largest area of conjoint acti-
ationwas found in the right posteriormiddle temporal gyruswith
ts peak in connectivity cluster IPL, located at 5mmdistance to con-
ectivity cluster TPJp found for our simple conjunction analysis. On
he left side, we found a smaller area of conjoint activation, with
ts peak in the posterior middle temporal gyrus. In addition, we
ound an area of conjoint activation in themedial prefrontal cortex,
overing parts of mPFC connectivity clusters 3 and 4.
Finally, we followed a third strategy to determine the over-
ap between task groups. We used the statistically more sensitivete meta-analyses. (D) Results of a more liberal multimodal meta-analysis of the six
ed and a cluster extent threshold 10 voxels.
multimodal meta-analysis (Radua et al., 2013) to determine areas
commonlyengagedby the six taskgroups. Similar towhatwe found
for the permutation-based approach, we found three areas of con-
joint activation for themultimodal analysis (see Table 4). Again, the
largest areawas found in the right temporo-parietal cortex. Its peak
was in the right posterior superior temporal gyrus corresponding to
connectivity cluster TPJp, at a distance of 13mm to the peak found
for simple conjunction overlap. On the left side, we found a smaller
cluster located in connectivity cluster TPJp. Finally, the multimodal
analysis found a cluster in the medial prefrontal cortex covering
mPFC connectivity clusters 3 and 4.
3.2. Region of interest (ROI) analyses
To characterize task-related differences in brain activation in
more detail, we relied on a ROI analysis. We extracted for each
study an effect-size estimate (Hedges g) for each ROI. Estimates
are displayed as boxplots for separate task groups in Figs. 4–6.
Below these boxplots, we indicated with a full circle if activation in
that ROI was found signiﬁcant in the mean analysis, at a threshold
of p< .005, z>1 (determined by permutation tests, see Section 2).
Empty circles indicate a trend toward an effect-size above chance
level at p< .05, z>1. Besides boxplots, we also present tables that
show the results of pairwise comparisons between task groups for
a ROI. Pairwise comparisons were calculated with a linear model
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Fig. 4. Regions of interest in posterior temporal and parietal brain areas. (a) Box-plots (median; 25th and 75th percentiles; 5th and 95th percentiles) show the distributions
of effect-sizes for the studies in each group. Effect-sizes were weighted by intra-study variances. Signiﬁcant convergence of effect-sizes above zero was determined by
randomization tests with SDM; full circles indicate p< .005 uncorrected, z>1. Empty circles indicate p< .05, z>1. (b) Results of pairwise meta-analytic comparisons between
all task groups for the regions of interest. Task groups are abbreviated by capital letters. Pairwise comparisons were calculated by linear contrasts with SDM. Full circles
indicate a signiﬁcant difference between two task groups at p< .005, Bonferroni corrected for the number of pairwise comparisons (n=15). Empty circles indicate p< .005
uncorrected.
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hat takes into account differences in sample size and variability
etween meta-analyses. In the tables, full-circles indicate a group-
ifference at p< .005 Bonferroni corrected, z>1 (corresponding to
n uncorrected p< .00033). Empty circles indicate a trend toward a
roup-difference at p< .005 uncorrected, z>1.
.2.1. Temporo-parietal ROIs
We selected four temporo-parietal ROIs in each hemisphere,
ased on activation peaks from clusters found in the pooled-meta
nalysis (indicated in boldface in Table 3). In addition to the left and
ight temporo-parietal cluster peak, we selected three subpeaks
o characterize the extent of this area (for details, see Section 2).
ur procedure resulted in bilateral ROIs in the anterior and poste-
ior connectivity clusters of the TPJ: Connectivity-cluster TPJa (left:
=−53, y=−30, z=10; right: x=47, y=−35, z=12) and connectiv-
ty cluster TPJp (left: x=−53, y=−59, z=20; right: x=56, y=−56,
= 18). In addition, we selected ROIs in connectivity cluster IPL
hich is distinct from the TPJ clusters (left: x=−46, y=−63, z=41;
ight: x=47, y=−61, z=39). Finally, we selected a posterior middle
emporal area, which was located substantially ventral to the TPJ
reas (left: x=−66, y=−52, z=2; right: x=64, y=−52, z=−3).
As shown in Fig. 4, ROIs #4 and #8 in the left and
ight posterior middle temporal gyri showed virtually no acti-
ations for the task groups false belief vs. photo, strategic
ames and trait judgments. A common element in these tasks
s that they do not show any behavioral cues of agency or
ntentionality (e.g., movement, facial expression, gaze). For the
ther task groups, we found activation in these ROIs. In the
eft posterior middle temporal ROI #4, we found signiﬁcant
ctivation for social animations and mind in the eyes (zs >2.7), and
trend for rational actions. Pairwise comparisons found that mind
n theeyes showedsigniﬁcantly stronger activation than falsebelief
s. photo and trait judgments (zs >4.1). In the right posterior mid-
le temporal ROI #8, we found signiﬁcant activation for mind in
he eyes and rational actions (zs >2.3) and a tendency for social
nimations. Pairwise comparisons showed group differences only
s tendencies.
ROIs #3 and #7 in connectivity clusters TPJa showed a related
attern to what we found for posterior middle temporal ROIs. Sig-
iﬁcant activation was found for social animations and rational
ctions (zs >2) and tendentially for mind in the eyes on the left
ide. On the right side, signiﬁcant activation was again found for
ocial animations and rational actions (zs >2.9), and tendencies
ere found formind in the eyes and false belief vs. photo. Only ten-
encies and no signiﬁcant group differenceswere found in bilateral
onnectivity clusters TPJa. A strikingly different pattern of acti-
ations was found for ROIs #2 and # 6 in connectivity clusters TPJp.
igniﬁcant activationwas found for all task groups on the right side
zs >2.3). Moreover, pairwise comparisons showed that activation
or false belief vs. photo was higher in this area compared to all
ther task groups (zs >2.5). On the left side, signiﬁcant activation
as found for all task groups but strategic games (zs >1.9). Again,
alse belief vs. photo activated the ROI stronger than all other task
roups (zs >1.9). In left and right connectivity cluster IPL ROI#1 and
5, signiﬁcant activation was only found for false belief vs. photo
zs >3.6). In addition, trait judgments activated bilateral connectiv-
ty cluster IPLROIs tendentially. Similar to connectivity cluster TPJp,
airwise comparisons also showed for connectivity cluster IPL ROIs
tronger activation for false belief vs. photo compared to a number
f other task groups. These were trait judgments, strategic games,
ind in the eyes and rational actions on the left side (zs >2.2), and
trategic games, social animations, mind in the eyes and rational
ctions on the right side (zs >1.6).havioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 23
3.2.2. Cortical midline ROIs
Cortical midline ROIs were selected in a similar fashion to ROIs
in the temporo-parietal cortex. We selected the cluster peaks in
the medial prefrontal cortex and in the precuneus (see Table 3).
In addition, we selected two more local subpeaks in the medial
prefrontal cortex, which were (i) at least 20mm apart from other
ROIs and (ii) fell into different connectivity clusters according to
the scheme by Sallet et al. (2013). The ROI for the medial prefrontal
peak was located in connectivity cluster 4, at x=−1, y=54, z=24.
More ventrally, a ROI was located at a subpeak within connectivity
cluster 3, at x=3, y=51, z=−7. Finally, a third medial prefrontal
ROIwas located substantiallymore dorsal/posterior in connectivity
cluster 2/preSMA, at x=6, y=26, z=55. The ROI in the precuneus
was located on the peak at x=4, y=−55, z=34. No sub-peaks were
found at a distance of more than 20mm. Effect-sizes of these ROIs
are shown in Fig. 5.
ROI #1 inmPFC connectivity cluster 3/ventralmPFC showed sig-
niﬁcant activation for false belief vs. photo, trait judgments and
strategic games (zs >2.3). Pairwise comparisons found stronger
activation for false belief vs. photo compared to social anima-
tions, mind in the eyes and rational actions (zs >1.8), as well as
stronger activation for trait judgments compared to mind in the
eyes (z=1.5). For ROI #2 in mPFC connectivity cluster 4/dorsal
mPFC, we again only found signiﬁcant activation for false belief
vs. photo, trait judgments and strategic games (zs >3.5). We also
found non-signiﬁcant tendencies for activation for all other task
groups. InROI#3 inmPFCconnectivity cluster2/pre-SMA,we found
signiﬁcant activation for trait judgments (z=2.1) and a trend for
mind in the eyes. Group differences were only found in the form of
non-signiﬁcant trends. Finally, in the precuneus ROI #4, we found
signiﬁcant activation for false belief vs. photo, trait judgments and
rational actions (zs >3.0), as well as a tendency for strategic games.
Pairwise comparisons showed, similar to what we found for the
right TPJp ROI, that false belief vs. photo activated the precuneus
ROI #4 signiﬁcantly stronger than all other task groups (zs >1.6).
In addition, trait judgments activated the precuneus ROI #4 more
strongly than mind in the eyes (z=2.1) and tendentially also more
strongly than strategic games and social animations.
3.2.3. Fronto-temporal ROIs
In accordance with ﬁndings from previous literature reviews
(Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Mar, 2011), our pooled meta-analysis
also found local subpeaks in more anterior parts of the bilateral
temporal lobes and in the bilateral inferior frontal gyri (see Table 3).
Peaks in the anterior temporal lobes were found near the temporal
poles (about 7mm distance in both hemispheres). Coordinates of
the anterior temporal ROIs were x=−51, y=0, z=−19, and x=53,
y=0, z=−21, respectively. We also extracted effect-size estimates
for areas in more central parts of the temporal lobes, located about
20mm posteriorly to anterior temporal ROIs at x=−59, y=−23,
z=−8, and x=62, y=−22, z=−10. For the inferior frontal gyri, we
selected ROIs at x=−46, y=22, z=8, and x=44, y=20, z=12.
As shown in Fig. 6, ROIs #1 and #4 in the left and right middle
temporal gyri showed activation for social animations and rational
actions on the left side (zs >2.4), and for false belief vs. photo and
rational actions (zs >2.0) on the right side. In addition, a tendency
for activationwas also found for social animations on the right side.
Pairwise comparisons found stronger activation for social anima-
tions and for rational actions compared to strategic games on the
left side (zs >2.2), and stronger activation for false belief vs. photo
compared to trait judgments and mind in the eyes on the right side
(zs >2.1). For ROIs #2 and #5 in the anterior temporal lobes, we
found signiﬁcant activation for trait judgments, social animations
and rational actions on the left side (zs >2.4), and signiﬁcant activa-
tion for false belief vs. photo, social animation and rational actions
on the right side (zs >2.3).On the left side,we further foundstronger
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eta-analytic comparisons; full circles indicate p< .005, Bonferroni corrected. Deta
ctivation for trait judgments compared to strategic games (z=1.8),
hereas no signiﬁcant group differences were found on the left
ide. For the left inferior frontal ROI #3, we found signiﬁcant acti-
ation for social animations andmind in the eyes (zs >2.9). Pairwise
omparisons found stronger activations for mind in the eyes com-
ared to false belief vs. photo, trait judgments, strategic games and
ational actions (zs >3.0). For social animations, we found stronger
ctivation compared to false belief vs. photo (z=3.1), and in trend
lso compared to other tasks in the left inferior frontal ROI #3. For
he right inferior frontal ROI #6, we again found signiﬁcant acti-
ation for mind in the eyes (z=2.4), and activation trends for trait
udgments and social animations. Group differences only emerged
s non-signiﬁcant trends.
. Discussion
.1. The role of conceptual variance for meta-analysing theory of
ind
Meta-analyses are a useful way to provide objective summaries
f the rapidly growing amount of research in the neuroimaging
omain. For a large and heterogeneous ﬁeld such as theory of mind
esearch, it is important to summarize ﬁndings with the appro-
riate level of detail. Different levels can be chosen, and each has
ts own merits and drawbacks. The most simple and straightfor-
ard way to meta-analyse ﬁndings is to put together all studies
hat call themselves a theory of mind task into a pooled analysis.f effect-sizes; full circles indicate p< .005 uncorrected, z>1. (b) Results of pairwise
e as for Fig. 4.
This approach was taken by previous meta-analyses on theory of
mind (Decety and Lamm,2007; Bzdoket al., 2012). A clear beneﬁt of
thepooled approach is that it has thebest statistical power todetect
activations, as it is based on a large sample of all available studies.
It will show which activations are robust despite all the variabil-
ity in the ﬁeld. Large variability, however, is also a drawback of
the pooled approach. A pooled meta-analysis puts together studies
using different stimulusmaterials and control conditions and stud-
ieswith variablemethodological quality. This inevitablywill create
a lot of noise. To check for variability in our pooled analysis, we per-
formed heterogeneity tests for the main ﬁndings. In support of our
expectation,we found that allmainﬁndings (TPJ,mPFC, precuneus)
were accompanied by signiﬁcant inter-study heterogeneity, which
means that the observed between-study variance was larger than
that resulting from sampling error alone. The presence of high vari-
ability in our pooled analysis indicates that this approach may be
missing some details about the functional neuroanatomy of theory
of mind. Another potential problem of a pooled analysis is that if
somestimulusmaterials or control conditionshavebeenusedmore
frequently than others, they will have a larger impact on the mean
result. Indeed, our literature review shows that some stimulus-
materials, like for example false belief vs. photo stories, have been
used more often than other stimuli.A way to address the variability in a meta-analysis is to sort
out conceptual ormethodological differences between studies, and
categorize them along a single stimulus- or task-dimension, as for
example verbal versus nonverbal format (Carrington and Bailey,
M. Schurz et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 25
F tions o
m ils sam
2
e
2
s
s
d
s
t
S
a
b
c
f
b
c
iig. 6. Regions of interest in fronto-temporal areas. (a) Box-plots show the distribu
eta-analytic comparisons; full circles indicate p< .005, Bonferroni corrected. Deta
009), story-based versus non story-based format (Mar, 2011) or
nduring versus transient mental state content (Van Overwalle,
009). The advantage of this approach is that statistical power is
till relatively high because the overall sample is split into just two
ubsamples. However, focusing on a single stimulus- or content-
imension bears the danger of mixing up effects due to other
timulus- or task-aspects not captured by this one dimension, and
hese may be of equal importance or interest for the overall results.
o, single-dimensioned meta-analyses may again be pooling data
cross a variety of different stimulus- and task-aspects, which will
ring substantial noise to the results. For example, it could be the
ase that story-based tasks present a certain mental state (e.g.,
alse-belief) more often than non-story based tasks. Or it could
e the case that non-story based tasks present a certain form of
ontrol condition (e.g., strategic games: participants are told they
nteract with a computer) more often than story-based tasks. Suchf effect-sizes; full circles indicate p< .005 uncorrected, z>1. (b) Results of pairwise
e as for Fig. 4.
differences would be potential confounds for the comparison
between story based and non-story based studies since they have
nothing to do with the verbal nature of the tasks. To avoid these
problems, it is necessary to separate studies based on the experi-
mental paradigms they used.
4.2. Contribution of the present meta-analysis
For the present meta-analysis, we formed task groups that had
comparable stimulus-material, instructions and control conditions.
We expected that this approach would reduce the problem of
pooling across conceptually and methodologically heterogeneous
studies. In support of this assumption, we observed relatively
little inter-study heterogeneity in the individual meta-analyses
compared to the pooled meta-analysis. No single task-speciﬁc
meta-analysis showed signiﬁcant inter-study heterogeneity for
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eaks in the right TPJ and the mPFC, and only one or two showed
etween-study variability for peaks in the left TPJ and the pre-
uneus. A potential drawback of our single task group approach is,
owever, that producing a number of conceptually homogeneous
eta-analyses will inevitably produce smaller samples, which
educes statistical power. We therefore used several strategies to
heck the quality of our results. We used jack-knife sensitivity
nalyses to evaluate the robustness of each individual analysis. All
eta-analyseswere recalculated several times, and each time adif-
erent studywas excluded from themeta-analytic sample. If results
emained unchanged in all recalculations of the meta-analysis, this
hows robustness against changes of the sample and thus, indi-
ates that meta-analytic ﬁndings are replicable. For example, for
ur smallest task group (strategic games, n=9) we found perfect
eplicability of ﬁndings in left and right TPJ and in the precuneus
9 out of 9 leave-one-out recalculations). In contrast, even in the
ooled meta-analysis (n=73) not all ﬁndings were perfectly repli-
able, as the left fusiform activation could be only found for 63 out
f 73 leave-one-out recalculations.
Most importantly, we took the problem of small sample size
nto account when testing for overlaps and differences between
ask groups. For overlaps, we relied on an alternative approach
o check for power-problems due to small sample-size. We not
nly calculated the simple overlap (conjunction) between individ-
al meta-analyses, as this approach may yield a false impression of
electivity. In addition, we carried out a permutation-based over-
ap analysis, wherewe determined the overlap between twohalves
f the pooled-meta analysis sample, each consisting of the studies
rom three different task groups. This procedure was repeated ten
imes to create every permutation for assigning six task groups to
wo sample-halves. Consequently, our procedure identiﬁed areas
ngaged in all task groups, but relied on much larger sample sizes
or meta-analyses (n>28). The permutation procedure (see Fig. 1C)
urned out to be more sensitive than an analysis of the overlap
etween the six individual meta-analyses (Fig. 1B). To avoid a false
mpression of selectivity due to small samples, we will rely on the
esults from our permutation based procedure in our discussion.
Differences in statistical power must be taken into account
hen comparing the results of different meta-analyses. For exam-
le, when one meta-analysis fails to implicate an area compared
o another one, this could reﬂect differences in sample sizes and
etween study variability rather than differences between the
asks. To factor this issue in our comparisons, we used a lin-
ar model approach which calculates the difference between two
eta-analyseswhile taking intoaccountdifferences in sample sizes
nd within- and between study variability. Indeed, our results
how a pattern that goes beyond what can be explained by power-
ifferences. For example, when comparing false belief vs. photo
asks with mind in the eyes tasks, we found both areas with over-
ctivation for false belief (e.g., bilateral IPL and TPJp) and areaswith
veractivation for mind in the eyes (e.g., left IFG). Meta-analytic
ifferences driven by power-differences can be expected only for
nedirection, i.e., overactivations for themeta-analysiswithhigher
ower, but not the other way around.
.3. Core network for theory of mind
Mar (2011) argued that looking at the overlap between meta-
nalyses for different paradigm-classes or experiments offers an
nteresting way for identifying a core-network for theory of mind.
he reason is that, whatever is pivotal for theory of mind will be
eﬂected by the convergence of separatemethodologies, which dif-
er in idiosyncratic design elements and will not contribute to the
verlap. Mar (2011) separated theory of mind research into story
ased versus non-story based tasks. In the present study, we per-
ormed a more detailed separation of task groups. In addition, wehavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34
performed a permutation based overlap analysis to ensure that our
ﬁne-grained study separation does not lead to a power-problem
and thus a false impression of selectivity. Our permutation based
analysis found three areas of overlap: The mPFC, left TPJ and right
TPJ (connectivity clustersTPJponboth sides). The sameresultswere
also found with an alternative statistical procedure for determin-
ing overlap between meta-analytic maps, a so-called multimodal
meta-analysis (Radua et al., 2013). The right TPJ cluster showed
the most robust overlap among all ﬁndings, as it could even be
found in a highly conservative and low-powered conjunction anal-
ysis. These results support the conclusion from earlier reviews that
a ‘core-network’ for theory of mind exists, i.e., that all sorts of the-
ory of mind tasks consistently engage a particular brain network,
includingmPFC andbilateral TPJ (e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith
and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). This also relates to theories that
have proposed a specialized mechanism for mental state attribu-
tion, as for example the “theory ofmindmechanism” (ToMM, Leslie
and Thaiss, 1992), whichwas conceived as amechanism that “kick-
starts belief and desire attribution” (Leslie et al., 2004). Our results,
however, suggest that this mechanism also includes attribution of
mental states other than beliefs and desires, as we also found acti-
vation in mPFC and bilateral TPJ for tasks like mind in the eyes and
trait judgments. The question about functional speciﬁcity, i.e., the
question whether some parts of mPFC and bilateral TPJ are exclu-
sively (or at least preferentially) engaged in theory of mind, goes
beyond the scope of our work. In the following sections, we will
discuss the functional roles of the core network’s components as
well as the implications of task-related differences that we found.
4.4. Areas for theory of mind
4.4.1. Temporo-parietal junction
TheTPJ is roughly characterizedas anareaat theborderbetween
the temporal and parietal lobes surrounding the ends of the Syl-
vian ﬁssure. It is sometimes also referred to as pSTS, posterior
IPL, Ventral Parietal Cortex, Angular Gyrus or Brodman Area 39.
This is linked to the lacking consensus on how coordinates, micro-
or macroanatomical landmarks should topographically deﬁne that
area. The functional heterogeneity of this area has become already
evident through patient and brain stimulation studies. On the one
hand, damage to the right TPJ frequently leads to an inability to
attend to stimuli that are presented in the contralateral visual ﬁeld
(i.e., neglect, see Corbetta and Shulman, 2011) and electrical stim-
ulation of the TPJ results in altered self-awareness. For example,
electrical stimulation to the right TPJ leads to the so-called ‘out-
of-body experience’ (Blanke et al., 2002), whereas stimulation to
the left TPJ leads to the perception of an ‘illusory shadow per-
son’ (Arzy et al., 2006). On the other hand, transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) of the right TPJ was found to affect belief rea-
soning: Young et al. (2010a) showed that after TMS, participants
were for example impaired in taking into account a person’s inten-
tion toharmwhenasked for amoral evaluationof an act of violence.
Moreover, two patient studies (Apperly et al., 2004; Samson et al.,
2004) reported that damage to the left TPJ leads to selective deﬁcits
in false belief reasoning, whereas other cognitive and executive
domains remained intact.
In the functional imaging ﬁeld, studies found that temporo-
parietal areas contributing to theory of mind can be functionally
divided into a more ventral/anterior part including the STS and
a more dorsal/posterior part in the TPJ (e.g., Bahnemann et al.,
2010; Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner and Leekam, 2008; Saxe, 2006).
However, the only formal literature review looking at task-related
differences for theory of mind (Van Overwalle, 2009) found equal
activation in the TPJ across a variety of tasks. A potential expla-
nation for the absence of task-related differences is that Van
Overwalle (2009) used one large ROI to analyze the TPJ, which
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id not allow checking for differences between anterior versus
osterior or dorsal versus ventral parts. The present study used a
hole-brain voxel wise meta-analysis that is capable of detecting
uch differences. Our results show two things: On the one hand, our
onjunction analysis found that all theory of mind tasks activate a
art of the TPJwhich roughly corresponds to area TPJp. On the other
and, we found task-related differences in our ROI analyses (see
ig. 4):More dorsal/posterior areas in the TPJ (TPJp and IPL) showed
tronger activation for false belief vs. photo, and tendentially also
or trait judgments, compared to other task. More anterior/ventral
reas (TPJa and pMTG) showed stronger activations for social ani-
ations, mind in the eyes and rational actions compared to other
asks.
The observed functional dissociation within the TPJ supports
revious theories (Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner and Leekam, 2008;
erner and Roessler, 2012). For example, Gobbini et al. (2007)
inked ventral/anterior TPJ to processing of overt mental states and
orsal/posterior TPJ to processing of covert mental states. Overt
ental states are inherent in perceived actions; covert mental
tates, such as false beliefs, are not necessarily associated with
urrent actions. Perner and Leekam (2008, see also Perner and
oessler, 2010, 2012) explained the functional separation in the TPJ
y drawing on the distinction between teleology and belief-desire
easoning which was found in developmental research. Theory of
ind tasks are ﬁrst of all subserved by teleology, we tell another
erson’s intention simply by knowing that a certain action is a
ational means to achieve a particular goal. Teleological reasoning
linked to ventral/anterior TPJ) is for example sufﬁcient to under-
tand social animations,mind in the eyes or rational actions. People
witch to belief-desire reasoning (linked to dorsal/posterior TPJ)
y considering agents’ subjective perspectives of what is needed
nly when required by the task (perspective tasks). In addition to
alse belief vs. photo, also trait judgments require awareness of per-
pective, but for different reasons. Traits are habitual patterns of
ehavior, thought, andemotion. They are characteristic for a person
hen the person’s habits deviate from the norm. For instance, the
raitword “stubborn” (Murphy et al., 2010) describes a personwho,
ccording to Merriam Webster Dictionary, refuses to change her
deas or to stop doing something. In otherwords, a stubborn person
till sees a point in persisting when objectively (from the judging
erson’s point of view) it is time to give up. In another example, a
erson is called “anxious” or “nervous” (Mitchell et al., 2002) if she
ends to be concerned about situations where one normally has
o reason to be anxious, i.e., the person takes a deviant perspec-
ive on how dangerous or challenging a situation is. So many traits
esult from habitually biased perspectives and trait judgments are
udgments aboutwhether a person habitually takes a different per-
pective on certain aspects of life.
The overall pattern found for the TPJ – overlap in the TPJp plus
unctional differentiations in TPJp and IPL versus TPJa and pMTG
can be linked to a concept of functional specialization referred
o as the ‘overarching view’. This concept was proposed by Cabeza
t al. (2012) with respect to the IPL. The overarching view assumes
hat although functional subdivisions within a broad brain region
xist, they are graded because each subdivision mediates a partic-
lar aspect of a global cognitive function supported by the broad
egion. In our case, the global cognitive function could be infer-
ing/predicting mental states based on (various forms of) available
nformation about a person. Within that broader region (i.e., the
PJ) sub regions apply the global function to different types of infor-
ationwhich vary according to patterns of functional connectivity.
We looked at whether the previously found structural connec-ivity networks of TPJa and TPJp (Mars et al., 2012; Bzdok et al.,
013) are reﬂected in patterns of task-related co-activations of our
OIs. We labeled our results according to a structural connectivity
ased parcellation (CBP) atlas by Mars et al. (2011, 2012). This atlashavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 27
is based on white-matter anatomy. Recently, Bzdok et al. (2013)
was able to corroborate this parcellation scheme based on two
functional connectivity measures, namely resting-state connectiv-
ity analysis andmeta-analytic co-activationmapping. Consistently,
Mars et al. (2012) and Bzdok et al. (2013) reported that a more
anterior portion of the TPJ, labeled as TPJa, is interconnected with
inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula and the SMA.Amoreposterior
portion of the TPJ, the TPJp, is interconnected with dorsal IPL, the
precuneus, the ventral mPFC, and posterior middle temporal areas.
When looking at similarities between task-related activation
patterns of different ROIs, we focus only on areas that relate to
the structural connectivity networks of TPJa (IFG) and TPJp (pMTG,
IPL, precuneus and mPFC). As summarized in Fig. 7, activation pat-
terns found in ROIs belonging to the same structural connectivity
network do not showaperfect correspondence to each other. How-
ever, some broad tendencies are observable. TPJa, IFG and pMTG
only activate for some of the task groups: social animations, ratio-
nal actions and mind in the eyes tasks. As discussed above, these
tasks present depictions of human action or behavior. On the other
hand, TPJa, IFG and pMTG univocally do not activate for false belief
vs. photo, trait judgments, and strategic games. Structural connec-
tivity shows a link between TPJa and IFG. However, the pMTG is
linked to TPJp rather than TPJa. The cortical midline areas mPFC
and precuneus activate most strongly for false belief vs. photo and
trait judgments. The IPL activates only for false belief vs. photo
(but tendentially also for trait judgments). The latter three areas
are all structurally linked to TPJp, which also activates strongly for
false belief vs. photo and at an average level for trait judgments.
However, the TPJp does not only activate for the latter two task
groups, but also for social animations,mind in the eyes and rational
actions, which could be due to its connections to the pMTG. Taken
together, our ROIs show some support for the idea that the nature
and location of activation in the TPJ is, at least in part, reﬂected
in the network of co-activated areas. Original imaging studies are
necessary to further clarify the extent to which activation in TPJa
versus TPJp can be predicted by connectivity-networks.
4.4.2. Medial prefrontal cortex
Strong activation of the mPFC has already been recognized in
early studies on theory of mind, which led to the initial assump-
tion that it is speciﬁcally linked to reasoning about belief (Frith and
Frith, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Leslie et al., 2004). However,
this hypothesis has been put into question by more recent patient
and imaging data. Bird et al. (2004) reported a case of a patientwith
an extensive medial prefrontal lesion but no impairment across a
wide range of theory of mind tasks, including the ‘strange stories’
testwhichprobes false-beliefunderstanding (see Jolliffe andBaron-
Cohen, 1999). Furthermore, while it was found that damage to the
left TPJ leads to selective deﬁcits in reasoning about belief, medial
frontal damage leads to deﬁcits both in belief reasoning and other
cognitive and executive tasks (Apperly et al., 2004; Samson et al.,
2004). In a functional imaging study, it was found that the mPFC is
equally engaged by stories about persons’ thoughts and by stories
about physical appearance or bodily sensations (Saxe and Powell,
2006). Based on this evidence Saxe and Powell (2006) suggested
that themPFC is not speciﬁcally engaged in belief-desire reasoning,
but more generally involved in processing socially or emotionally
relevant information about others (see also Aichhorn et al., 2006).
Behrens et al. (2008) showed that themPFC uses information about
others to compute an overall impression of another’s personality.
During interactive games, Behrens et al. (2008) found that trial-by-
trial changes in activation in the mPFC reﬂect learning about the
‘social value’ of another player, e.g., the gradual build-up of a pre-
dictionabouthowreliable theotherplayer is. This is consistentwith
the idea that mPFC is particularly engaged when participants are
asked to make judgments about a person’s enduring psychological
28 M. Schurz et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34
Fig. 7. Schematic summary of signiﬁcant activations in ROIs that are linked to the structural connectivity networks of TPJa and TPJp. Labels for ROIs are the same as in
previous ﬁgures. Task groups are abbreviated by capital letters. Black font indicates that mean-analysis shows signiﬁcant activation for a task group in that ROI (p< .005
uncorrected, z>1). Underlined letters indicate that linear-contrasts found stronger activation for this task group compared to others in an area (p< .005, Bonferroni corrected
for the number of pairwise comparisons).
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nd social properties, such as for example personality traits (Van
verwalle, 2009). Interestingly, Krienen et al. (2010) has recently
hown that mPFC activation during trait judgments is driven by
he social closeness of the target-person (e.g., friend or stranger?)
ather than by mental or psychological characteristics (e.g., how
imilar are these traits to my own?).
Although our permutation based conjunction showed that dor-
al parts of the mPFC are engaged by all theory of mind tasks, we
ound in our ROI analyses (see Fig. 5) that activation is particularly
trong for false belief vs. photo, strategic games and trait judg-
ent tasks, and less reliable for social animations, mind in the eyes
nd rational actions. The relevant difference between these tasks
ay be the time-scale on which socially relevant information is
rocessed. False-belief stories often tell about multiple events in a
erson’s life, and strategic gamespresent the sameopponent across
ultiple rounds of the game. Trait judgments explicitly ask to think
bout enduring personality traits. On the other hand, social anima-
ions,mind in the eyes and rational actions often showonly a single
ction, behavior or facial expression. Presumably, such information
s less relevant for reasoning about a person’s stable personality
raits or her ‘social value’.
.4.3. Precuneus
Little evidence concerning the precuneus exists from patient
nd brain stimulation research, mainly because of its hidden loca-
ion within the parietal lobe. Despite strong agreement on the fact
hat activation of the precuneus is one of themost robust correlates
f theory of mind, the area has received relatively little attention in
unctional accounts. Convergent research shows that theprecuneus
s implicated in visuo-spatial mental imagery. The precuneus is
ngaged by motor imagery (e.g., Hanakawa et al., 2003), by mental
otation (Suchan et al., 2002), mental simulation of routes (Ghaem
t al., 1997), and by mental model building in deductive reasoning
asks (e.g., Knauff et al., 2003; Kulakova et al., 2013). In addition, the
recuneus is engaged in judgments about another person’s visual
erspective (Vogeley et al., 2004). Based on these ﬁndings, Cavanna
nd Trimble (2006) have proposed that one main function of the
recuneus in theoryofmind ismental imagery to represent theper-
pective of another person. Results fromourROI analysis (see Fig. 5)
how strong activation for false belief vs. photo, trait-judgments
nd rational actions. These tasks canall be linked tomental imagery.
alse belief vs. photo and rational action tasks often tell a ﬁctional
tory or showaﬁctional event,which invitesmental imaging. Traits
re, to some extent, reﬂected in the habitual patterns of behavior
f a person. Therefore, making trait judgments also induces mental
magery of how a person acts or behaves in ﬁctitious situations. On
he other hand, social animations andmind in the eyesmost clearly
o not activate the precuneus, which is consistent with a men-
al imagery function, because for the latter two tasks the relevant
ction is shown and does not need to be imagined.
.4.4. Anterior temporal lobes
Studies of semantic dementia patients (for a review, see
atterson et al., 2007) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (e.g.,
ambon Ralph et al., 2009) showed that the anterior temporal lobes
re critical for the storage of semantic knowledge. For example, it
s assumed that the anterior temporal lobes store semantic con-
epts which allow generalization of knowledge from one exemplar
o another (Lambon Ralph and Patterson, 2008). With respect to
ocial cognition, researchers suggested that the anterior tempo-
al lobes are important for storage and retrieval of social semantic
cripts (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). A
cript refers to general world knowledge which can be seen as a
ecord of which particular activities will take place in a particu-
ar setting. An example was given by Gallagher and Frith (2003, p.
7): ‘. . . the activities associated with the restaurant script wouldhavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34 29
include reading the menu, ordering a drink and getting the bill. If I
catch the waiter’s eye and make the gesture of writing on my left
palm with my right foreﬁnger he will usually bring me the bill. He
correctly interprets my actions on the basis of his knowledge of my
likely goals. . .’.
Recent research has extended this line of reasoning, and arrived
at the conclusion that the anterior temporal lobes provide not
only scripts but social semantic concepts in general. For exam-
ple, Zahn et al. (2007) asked participants to judge the semantic
similarity of word pairs which were either descriptive of human
social semantic concepts (‘honor’ – ‘brave’) or describing biologi-
cal function (‘nutritious’ – ‘useful’). Social semantic concepts were
speciﬁcally associated with an increase in activation in bilateral
anterior temporal lobes. Sugiura et al. (2006) showed that the ante-
rior temporal lobes are also important areas for recognition of
personally familiar or known persons, which is based on relating
semantic information to persons (see also Tsukiura et al., 2010).
Ross and Olson (2010) showed that overlapping areas of the ante-
rior temporal lobes are engaged by social animations (comparable
to those in ourmeta-analysis), semantic judgments on socialwords
(comparable to thosepresentedduring trait judgments inourmeta-
analysis), and by stories about persons which require reasoning
about intentions. The authors concluded that the anterior temporal
lobes contribute to the understanding of implied meaning through
access to both general conceptual knowledge and to speciﬁc social
conceptual knowledge, suchasbackgroundknowledge about social
descriptors (e.g., words like friendly and devious), and knowledge
about social rules and social etiquette. Findings from our meta-
analysis (see Fig. 6) are in support of this social semantic concept
interpretation. Activation in the anterior temporal lobes was found
for trait judgments containing social concept words, as well as for
false belief vs. photo social animations and rational actions, which
all contain a sequence of actions in a social script (e.g., Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Olson et al., 2007). In addition, some of these task
groups also activated more central areas in the middle temporal
lobe, whereas activation for trait judgments was restricted to the
anterior temporal lobes.
4.4.5. Inferior frontal gyrus
The present meta-analysis found convergent activation in the
left inferior frontal gyrus only for the task groups social anima-
tions and mind in the eyes. For both types of tasks, evidence has
suggested that inferior frontal mirror neuron circuits aid in iden-
tiﬁcation of the observed actions and emotional expressions by a
‘common coding’ mechanism for action and perception (see e.g.,
Keysers et al., 2010; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). Functional imag-
ing research shows that the inferior frontal gyrus is engaged in both
the execution of actions and in the observation of these actions per-
formed by someone else (for review, see Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004). Furthermore, Carr et al. (2003) showed that these inferior
frontal areas support emotion identiﬁcation and empathy due to
their connections to the limbic system.
The functional signiﬁcance of the inferior frontal gyrus for
processing of abstract displays of implied biological movements
was shown in a study by Saygin (2007). The authors found that
a group of unilateral stroke patients with lesions to either the
left or the right inferior frontal gyrus were severely impaired in
correctly identifying the human actions depicted by point-light
displays (e.g., walking, jogging, . . .). With functional imaging, the
authors additionally showed that these frontal areaswere activated
in nonimpaired adults for the identiﬁcation of actions depicted by
point-light displays. With respect to the mind in the eyes task,
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) found that a group of patients with
lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus had particular difﬁculties here,
but performed unimpaired on a second-order false belief task
(Stone et al., 1998). In addition, the patients scored relatively low
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n affective empathy scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
uestionnaire (Davis, 1983), namely the scales ‘emphatic concern’
e.g., ‘I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less for-
unate than me’) and ‘personal distress’ (e.g., ‘being in a tense
motional situation scares me’). Taken together, the patient stud-
es highlight that the inferior frontal gyrus is a crucial structure for
articular forms of theory of mind reasoning, which two out of the
ix task groups from our meta-analysis tap into.
.5. Limitations
Thismeta-analysis is intended to give an overviewof the rapidly
rowing ﬁeld of imaging research on theory of mind. Our focus on
tandard task-based neuroimaging data dismisses other evidence
hich is crucial for understanding the neural underpinnings of the-
ry of mind. First of all, the reviewed imaging data, essentially
orrelational in nature, should always be supplemented by data
elated to causality, such as TMS and brain lesion studies. We have
ncorporated both kinds of evidence in our discussion of brain areas
o highlight the importance of causal considerations. Second, our
eta-analytic procedure excluded ﬁndings from advanced meth-
ds of analysis. For example, some studies with strategic games
sed computational modeling for data analysis (Yoshida et al.,
010; Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008). These studies
ound that the pSTS computes discrepancies between the behavior
hat one expects from another player (indicated by the nature of
ne’s own decision) and her actual behavior (Behrens et al., 2008;
ampton et al., 2008). The mPFC, on the other hand, computes (i.e.,
earning) the social “value” of another player, e.g., how much one
an trust that person (Behrens et al., 2008).
. Conclusion
For the present meta-analysis, we formed task groups that
ad comparable stimulus-material, instructions and control condi-
ions. Meta-analytic assessments of between-study heterogeneity
howed that our approach reduces the problem of pooling across
onceptually and methodologically different studies. We carried
ut overlap analyses between task groups, and found that themPFC
nd bilateral posterior TPJ (connectivity cluster TPJp) showed acti-
ation for all theory of mind tasks. This is in line with claims
bout the existence of a ‘core-network’ for theory of mind, i.e., that
ll sorts of theory of mind tasks consistently engage a particular
rain network (e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006;
itchell, 2009). In addition,we performed ROI analysis and found a
umber of task-related activation differences along with the core-
etwork. For example, we found that more dorsal/posterior parts
f the TPJ are particularly engaged for tasks that require processing
f mental perspectives (Perner and Leekam, 2008; Perner and
oessler, 2012), namely false belief vs. photo and tendentially trait
udgments. More ventral/anterior parts of the TPJ are preferen-
ially activated by tasks which depict rational actions or behavior.
ogether, this pattern of overlap and surrounding activation differ-
nces canbe linked toaconceptof functional specialization referred
o as the ‘overarching view’ (Cabeza et al., 2012), which has been
uggested for the IPL. This view assumes that although functional
ubdivisions within a broad brain region exist, they are graded
ecause each subdivision mediates a particular aspect of a global
ognitive function supported by the broad region. In our case, the
lobal cognitive function could be inferring/predicting unobserva-
le mental states based on (various forms of) available information
bout a person. Sub regions apply this global function to different
ypes of informationwhich vary according to patterns of functional
nd structural brain connectivity. In support of the connectivity-
iew, we found that similarities between ROI-activation patternshavioral Reviews 42 (2014) 9–34
are consistent patternswith structural brain connectivity networks
of TPJ subdivisions (see Mars et al., 2012).
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.
2014.01.009.
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